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27 Abstract 
29 
30 We examine stock market reactions and liquidity effects following the first bank loan 
31 announcement of zero-leverage firms. Using a sample of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 
32 350 index over the time period of 2000-2015, we find evidence of a significant and permanent 
33 stock price increase as a result of the initial debt announcement. The loan announcement results in 
34 a sustained increase in trading volume and liquidity. This improvement continues to persist once 
35 we control for stock price and trading volume effects in both the short and long run. Furthermore, 
36 we examine the spread decomposition around the same period, and discover the adverse selection 
38 of the bid-ask spread is significantly related to the initial bank loan announcement. Our results can 
39 be attributed to the information cost/liquidity hypothesis, suggesting that investors demand a lower 
40 premium for trading stocks with more available information. 
41 
42 Keywords: Zero-leverage, initial bank loans, liquidity, bid-ask spreads, information asymmetry, 
43 price impact. 
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4 1. Introduction 
5 
6 
7 One of the most puzzling issues in financial management research is that some firms adopt a 
8 
9 zero-leverage capital structure policy. This is when a company does not possess any short or long- 
10 
11 term debt. The reason that zero-leverage is surprising is that companies should use debt financing 
12 
13 when they build up their capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
15 
16 However, a zero-leverage capital structure policy is becoming increasingly popular over time. 
17 
18 Strebulaev and Yang (2013) finds for United States (US) companies on average, 10.2% of firms 
19 
20 do not have any debts in a period from 1962 to 2009. Dang (2013) discovers more than 12.18% of 
22 
23 public, nonfinancial United Kingdom (UK) companies operate a zero-leverage policy between 
24 
25 1980 and 2007. Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan and Krishnamurthy (2012) establishes three main 
26 
27 motivations for firms to remain debt free, namely, the need for financial flexibility (Graham & 
28 
29 
30 Harvey, 2001), managerial entrenchment (Jensen & Mecking, 1976), and credit constraints 
31 
32 (Diamonds, 1991). The Financial flexibility hypothesis suggests firms remain zero-leverage to 
33 
34 avoid financial distress when they suffer negative exogenous shocks. The managerial 
35 
36 entrenchment hypothesis states that the management of the firm chooses to remain debt free in 
38 
39 order to reduce financial risks, protect their personal capital and/or increase their control among 
40 
41 the board. On the other hand, the supporters of credit hypothesis believe that firms do not remain 
42 
43 unlevered by choice, credit constraints are the main reason as they do not have access to public 
45 
46 markets, which limits their ability to borrow. 
47 
48 Ferguson and Grosse (2014) investigate the relationship between zero-leverage firms and their 
49 
50 initial bank loan announcements. This is a very interesting avenue of research as it looks at stock 
51 
52 
53 market reaction when zero-leverage companies use debt for the first time in their capital structure. 
54 
55 The results using data from the Australian Mining Industry show that bank loan announcements 
55 
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3 can signal important price sensitive information regarding the borrowing firm’s inside information. 
4 
5 
They go on to establish that the initial loan announcements relate with decreasing stock market 
7 
8 liquidity (bid-ask spreads) and information asymmetry. 
9 
10 Our research contributes to the previous literature in the following ways: First, prior studies 
11 
12 make the unrealistic assumption that changes in total bid-ask spreads are directly associated with 
14 
15 movements in information asymmetry. The bid-ask spread is made up of three components, each 
16 
17 of them contributing to various aspects of trading costs. The order processing component measures 
18 
19 the cost of executing the trade on a stock exchange (see among others, De Jong, Nijman and Roell, 
20 
21 
22 1996). The inventory holding component captures the costs that market makers face due to the fact 
23 
24 that they hold an undiversified portfolio (see among others, Huang & Stoll, 1997). The asymmetric 
25 
26 cost component provides a proxy for information asymmetry as market makers could be dealing 
27 
28 
with investors that possess superior information to them (see among others, Glosten & Milgrom, 
30 
31 1985). We are the only study to date to empirically examine the relationship between initial loan 
32 
33 announcements and information asymmetry of firms. We accomplish this by decomposing the 
34 
35 asymmetric cost component from the total bid-ask spread. 
37 
38 Second, we are the only study to inspect the impact of initial loan announcements on liquidity 
39 
40 in both the short and long run. This is achieved by analysing a 90 day event window and also by 
41 
42 capturing liquidity affects through price impacts rather than just via bid-ask spreads. Price impact 
43 
44 
45 ratios established by Amihud (2002) and Florackis, Gregoriou and Kostakis (2011) encapsulate 
46 
47 the long term financial stability of a company as permanent changes in prices reflect alterations in 
48 
49 the information environment of a firm. 
50 
51 
Third, previous empirical evidence is undertaken only on a single industry. According to 
53 
54 Strebulaev and Yang (2013), the zero-leverage phenomenon has no relationship with any particular 
55 
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1 
2 
3 industry, implying that we should look at a variety of industries in order to obtain robust results. 
4 
5 
We provide a complete analysis that is representative of the entire UK stock market, by  focusing 
7 
8 on the FTSE 350 index listed on the London Stock Exchange. The FTSE 350 index is the 
9 
10 aggregation of the FTSE 100 and 250 index and represents the largest 350 firms listed on the UK 
11 
12 stock market with respect to market capitalization. The FTSE 350 is a good proxy of the UK stock 
14 
15 market as it contributes to around 89% of the entire trading volume on the London Stock Exchange. 
16 
17 The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In the next section we provide 
18 
19 a review of the previous literature. Section 3 discusses the data resources and methodology used. 
20 
21 
22 Section 4 reports the empirical analysis of the stock market reaction of bank loan announcements 
23 
24 of zero-leverage firm. Our summary and conclusion are presented in section 5. 
25 
26 2. Literature review 
27 
28 
Previous studies have primarily focused on establishing the economic rationale behind the 
30 
31 zero-leverage phenomenon. Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan and Krishnamurthy (2012) find that the 
32 
33 zero-leverage firms are usually small, private, and young, thus the reason to keep debt-free is credit 
34 
35 constrained. More recent work by Strebulaev and Yang (2013) show that some zero-leverage 
37 
38 firms are more profitable, pay substantially higher dividends, have higher market-to-book ratios 
39 
40 and cash balances. In contrast to earlier studies, they find that zero-debt firms are neither younger 
41 
42 nor smaller than their leveraged proxy firms. Under the trade-off theory of capital structure, when 
43 
44 
45 zero-debt firms discover the net benefit of debt is positive, they will move towards their preferred 
46 
47 capital structure by levering up. Strebulaev and Yang show that a significant number of firms 
48 
49 persistently follow zero or low leverage policy, even though such firms could apparently increase 
50 
51 
their value by around 7% in tax shields when they lever up. 
53 
54 Diamond (1991) finds that zero-leverage firms have the opportunity to increase their 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
1Our sample excludes financial, utility companies and closed-end funds. 
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1 
2 
3 leverage but are still choosing to keep debt free. He believes it is due to financial constraints 
4 
5 
because firms may not be able to find debt sources. Thus, firms that have low or zero-leverage are 
7 
8 more likely to borrow from financial intermediaries like banks, since they are more informationally 
9 
10 opaque. Very little public information is available about such firms, and given their small size, the 
11 
12 relative cost of collecting information can be quite high (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006). Hadlock 
14 
15 and James (2002) indicate that zero-leverage firms derive greater benefits from the screening and 
16 
17 monitoring entailed in bank lending relations, because they suffer more from adverse selection and 
18 
19 information asymmetry problem than the levered firms. When firms are well monitored and have 
20 
21 
22 established reputations, banks have less comparative advantage in the external financing process 
23 
24 and there are no loan announcement effects. On the other hand, for firms which are younger, less 
25 
26 reputable with scarce public information, the market reaction of initial loan announcements is 
27 
28 
significantly positive (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000). 
30 
31 Diamond (1991) indicates that bank lending activities certify firm quality and signal credit 
32 
33 worthiness to outside investors. Bank relations allow firms to borrow and repay from bank until 
34 
35 they establish a good credit history to counter adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
37 
38 intrinsic to the external financing process. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1999) believes that the 
39 
40 initial bank loan means the borrower starts to be monitored by financial intermediates and the bank 
41 
42 debt significantly reduces the monitoring cost. 
43 
44 
45 3. Data and Methodology 
46 
47 3.1 Data 
48 
49 We collect data from all the FTSE 350 firms actively traded from the start of January 2000 to 
50 
51 
the end of December 20151. The FTSE 350 consists of the 350 largest firms listed on the London 
53 
54 
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1 
2 
3 Stock Exchange with respect to market capitalization2. 
4 
5 
We collect all FTSE 350 data from Thomas Reuter Eikon, a worldscope fundamental financial 
7 
8 database, for each company we obtain the company’s daily trade and closing price, bid price  and 
9 
10 ask  price,  trading  volume  (number  of  stocks  traded),  stock  turnover  (the  average  of shares 
11 
12 outstanding during the period divided by total number of shares traded), D/E ratio (firm’s debt 
14 
15 divided by firm’s equity) and market valuation (number of shares traded multiple by the share 
16 
17 price). We also collect information concerning the initial loan undertaken by the firm including 
18 
19 the issue date, loan amount, and loan maturity.3 We also calculate the L/A ratio is defined as Loan 
20 
21 
22 amount to total assets ratio. In total, there are 96 zero-leverage firms within the FTSE 350 that 
23 
24 have sufficient data for our study. 
25 
26 3.2 Methodology 
27 
28 
3.2.1 Absolute Spread, Relative Spread and Effective Spread 
30 
31 Previous literatures provide a menu of proxies to estimate liquidity and information 
32 
33 asymmetry. A common finding in asymmetric information models (see among others Glosten & 
34 
35 Milgrom, 1985) predict that a reduction in information asymmetry will motivate the market maker 
37 
38 to decrease the bid-ask spread. The simplest way to measure the spread is the absolute bid-ask 
39 
40 spread (AS), which is defined in equation (1). ASi,t=Ai,t-Bi,t 
41 
42 (1) 
43 
44 
45 Where ASi,t is the absolute bid-ask spread of stock i at the time t. Ai,t is the closing ask price 
46 
47 of stock i at time t and Bi,t is the closing bid price of stock i at time period t. However, some 
48 
49 researches such as Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (hereafter, MRR) (1997) indicate that the 
50 
51 
52 
53    
54 2 For more information on the FTSE 350 please see londonstockexchange.com. Also the FTSE 350 factsheet is 
55 available from http://www.ftse.com/Analytics/Factsheets/temp/1550722b-648a-4ee7-82d6-bed50f09bb55.pdf. 
56 3 In our dataset the announcement and the issue date of the loan are identical. 
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1 
2 
3 absolute bid-ask spread is not reliable for measuring investors’ trading costs. Many trades are 
4 
5 
executed within the bid-ask spread, resulting in absolute bid-ask spreads overstating the trade 
7 
8 execution cost. Therefore the relative bid-ask spread, which is calculated by dividing the absolute 
9 
10 bid-ask spread by the average of the bid and ask prices, may be a more accurate measure of stock 
11 
12 market liquidity. 
14 A𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ― B𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
15 RS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 
16 
17 
 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + B𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)/2 (2) 
18 Where RSi,t is the relative spread of stock i at time period t, Ai,t and Bi,t are defined in the same 
19 
20 way as in equation (1). The relative bid-ask spread also has a problem, which is that any changes 
21 
22 in the midpoint (Mid, defined as ask price minus bid price then divided by 2) of the stock price 
24 
25 will automatically impact on the bid-ask spread (see among others, Florackis, Gregoriou and 
26 
27 Kostakis (2011) for more information). In addition, the relative bid-ask spread fails to account for 
28 
29 the tendency of stock prices to increase following a buy and decrease following a sale, and 
30 
31 
32 overestimates the liquidity cost of a stock4. Due to these shortcomings, the existing market 
33 
34 microstructure literatures also estimate the effective bid-ask spread (ES). 
35 
36 The effective spread is often considered more reliable than the other spread measures because 
37 
38 it does not depend on quotes prices, reflects the actual transaction cost for an average sized trade 
40 
41 and the true liquidity cost (see among others, MRR (1997)). The greater the difference between 
42 
43 absolute and effective spreads, the larger the number of trades that were executed from prices 
44 
45 within the prevailing bid-ask quotes. Effective bid-ask spreads are calculated as twice the absolute 
47 
48 value of the actual execution price minus the mid-point of the quoted bid-ask spread immediately 
49 
50 before the transaction. 
51 
52 ESi,t=2|P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ― Mid𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡| 
54 
(3) 
55    
56 4For more information on the bid-ask bounce see Roll (1984). 
(A 
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1 
2 
3 Where ESi,t refers to the effective bid-ask spread of stock i at time period t, Pi,t is the stock price 
4 
5 
of stock i at time period t and Mid 
7 
 
i,t is the midpoint between the bid and the ask price of stock i at 
8 time period t. While the effective spread is a better measure for customer trader costs than the 
9 
10 quoted spread, it still fails to account for the fact that trades may be executed between  customers 
11 
12 and may not involve the participation of the market maker at all. Therefore, in order to provide 
14 
15 robust empirical evidence we estimate all three bid-ask spread measures in our study. 
16 
17 3.2.2 Price Impact Ratio Test 
18 
19 Bid-ask spreads measure information asymmetry problem and liquidity only for a small 
20 
21 
22 number of shares in a short-run period. Also closing prices which are widely used to measure the 
23 
24 spreads have a tendency to occur at the ask price which leads to inaccurate results (Florackis, 
25 
26 Gregoriou & Kostakis,2011). In 2002, Amihud develops a measure of stock illiquidity that is 
27 
28 
calculated using daily or monthly price and trading volume data. Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, or 
30 
31 RtoV ratio is defined as absolute daily return on stock i, divided by the firm’s daily monetary 
32 
33 volume, average over a trading period. 
34 5
RtoV = 
1 
∑D𝑖𝑖 |R𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑|   (4) 36 
i 
37 
D𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 = 1 V𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 
38 
39 Where ∣Ri,d 
40 
∣and Vi,d refers to the absolute return and monetary volume of stock i on day d 
41 respectively, Di is the number of trading days for stock i. Amihud’s ratio computes the average 
42 
43 daily price computes associated with a unit of trading volume, it is straightforward and easy to 
45 
46 calculate for long-run time periods and data is generally available from financial databases. 
47 
48 However, according to Florackis, Gregoriou and Kostakis (2011) and many other researches, RtoV 
49 
50 ratios carry a significant size bias, since trading volume variables in monetary terms is positively 
51 
52 
53 correlated with market capitalization. Given these shortcomings, Florackis, Gregoriou and 
54 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
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55 Kostakis (2011) construct a new price impact ratio, defined as the average ratio of daily absolute 
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1 
2 
3 stock return to its turnover ratio (RtoTR ratio): 
4 
5 1 
∑D𝑖𝑖 |R𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑|   6 RtoTRi=D𝑖𝑖 7 
8 
𝑑𝑑 = 1TR𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 (5) 
9 Where TRi,d refers to the turnover ratio of stock i at day d, Di and Ri,d is same as previously 
10 
11 defined in equation (4). The RtoTR ratio is free of any size bias (Florackis, Gregoriou & Kostakis, 
12 
13 2011). Therefore, it can be compared across the firms with different market capitalizations. Given 
14 
15 
these analysis, in our study we compute both the RtoV ratio and RtoTR ratios for completeness. 
17 
18 3.2.3 Multivariate Analysis 
19 
20 Following Hedge and McDermott (2003) and other previous studies, we test the relation 
21 
22 between liquidity changes and other determinants by a pooled time series cross-sectional 
24 
25 multivariate analysis: 
26 
27 LogLiqi,t=β0+β1Initiali,t+β2LogVoli,t+β3LogSizei,t+β4StdDevi,t+β5LogPricei,t+β6LogL/Ai,t+εi,t 
28 
29 for i=1,2…..96 and t=1,2 (6) 
31 
32 Where t=1 corresponds to the pre-announcement period and t=2 corresponds to the post- 
33 
34 announcement period. The subscript i denotes the 96 zero-leverage firms’ stock in our study. The 
35 
36 dependent variable, logLiqi,t is defined as the natural logarithm of the average daily five liquidity 
38 
39 benchmarks, absolute spreads, relative spreads, effective spreads, RtoV and RtoTR ratios, for stock 
40 
41 i at time t. Independent variables include the dummy variables Initiali,t, which is equals to 1 in the 
42 
43 post-announcement period and 0 otherwise. logVoli,t, corresponds to the natural logarithm of the 
44 
45 
daily trading volume in stock i at time t. LogSize 
47 
 
i,t captures the natural logarithm of the market 
48 capitalization of firm i at time t. LogStdDevi,t is the daily return standard deviation which captures 
49 
50 the volatility of stock i at the time t. LogPricei,t is the natural logarithm daily closing price of stock 
51 
52 i at time t. LogL/Ai,t is the natural logarithm loan amount to total asset ratio. We are primarily 
54 
55 interested in the significant and the magnificent of the dummy variable Initial, β1. 
55 
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1 
2 
3 3.2.4 Spread Decomposition 
4 
5 
Several  different  approaches  to  estimating  the  bid-ask  spread  components  exist  in  the 
7 
8 literature. One of the most predominately used is the Probability of information–based trade (PIN) 
9 
10 model established by Easley, Liefer, O’Hara and Papeman (1996). Numerous studies (see among 
11 
12 others, Glosten & Milgrom, 1985) have found evidence of adverse selection costs due to 
14 
15 information-based trading. The PIN model assumes that in a competitive market, liquidity traders 
16 
17 are likely to buy or sell stocks randomly. The motivation of their placement of an order or not is 
18 
19 based on two independent processes with identical intensity parameter ϖ. The probability that an 
21 
22 information occur in the event day is a, good news events occur with a probability , informed 
23 
24 traders buy. Bad news occur take place with a probability (1-δ), informed traders sell (Zagaglia, 
25 
26 
27 2013). The arrival of informed orders is modelled as a poisson process with intensity parameter u 
28 
29 assumed to be identical for informed buy and sell orders. Following Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and 
30 
31 Papeman (1996), We estimate the PIN model by measuring the maximum likelihood for each zero- 
32 
33 
leverage firm during the examination period. The likelihood function of PIN model is: 
35 
36 L[M|θ]=∑𝑇𝑇 
37 
38 
[ ― 2+MtLnχ+(Buyt+Sellt)ln(u+ω)]+∑𝑇𝑇 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛[a(1-a)e-muχ𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 -𝑀𝑀 +aδe-uχ 
39 𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡-𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+(1-a)χ𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+Sellt-Mt]. (7a) 
40 
41 With Mt equals to min (Buyt, Sellt) +max (Buyt,Sellt)/2, and χt =ϖ/(u+ϖ). Where we define 
43 
44 the Buy and Sell are the number of buy orders and sell orders for a given data and parameter space 
45 
46 θ= a,δ, ϖ, u. Buy arrival rate as ϖb, sell arrival rate as ϖb +u. The likelihood demonstrates that the 
47 
48 
49 buy orders and sell orders arrive the market according to independent poisson distributions (Duarte 
50 
51 and Young, 2009). Therefore the unconditional probability of informed trading can be estimated 
52 
53 as: 
54 
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a + 2 
 
 
 
(7b) 
7 Boehmer, Gramming and Theissen (2007) believes one of the most attractive feature of PIN 
8 
9 model is its simplicity because it requires data on the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated 
11 
12 trades. However, this requirement is not as easy as it appears, trading classification is difficult in 
13 
14 some markets and the bias caused by trade misclassification is substantial. For many security 
15 
16 markets which do not exclusively rely on an electronic limit order book (e.g. the Nasdaq), this 
17 
18 
information is not publicly available. 
20 
21 The second model we consider is the MRR model which decomposes the bid-ask spread into 
22 
23 adverse selection and order processing costs. This provides a unified framework which explains the 
24 
25 effect of information flows on stock prices over the day. 
27 
28 
29 
30 Pt denotes the transaction price of the security at time t and Q be the trade indicator variable, 
31 
32 equalling 1 if the trade is buy-oriented, and -1 if it is sell-oriented. The MRR model can be computed 
34 
35 as: 
36 
37 Pt-Pt-1=α(Qt-ρQt-1)+ϕ(Qt-Qt-1)+ εt (8) 
38 
39 
Where  captures possible adverse selection costs revealed by the trade at time t. The 
41 
42 parameter ρ captures the serial correlation in the trade indicator variable Qt. The second term, 
43 
44 (Qt-Qt-1) captures the effect of the bid-ask bounce, where  ≥ 0 denotes the liquidity suppliers’ 
46 
47 cost per share for supplying liquidity. And t is a random error term.  Following the MRR model, 
48 
49 the parameter vector, ,  and  can be estimated using the GMM estimator proposed by Hansen 
51 
52 (1982). 
53 
54 The PIN and MRR models fail in categorizing the adverse-selection and inventory holding 
56 
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1 
2 
3 costs, which leads to a revision after a trade which occurs concurrently. Thus, one of the most 
4 
5 
significant theoretical contributions of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model is that they allow for 
7 
8 separate estimation of the adverse selection and inventory holding costs. 
9 
10 Defining the trader indicator as Q, Q=1 if a transaction is buyer initiated, Q=-1 if it is seller 
11 
12 initiated and Q=0 if the transaction occurs at the midpoint. Therefore, the three-way decomposition 
14 
15 model for any time point of a day is: 
16 
17 E(Qt-1|Qt-2)=(1-2π)Qt-2 (9) 
18 19 S𝑡𝑡 ― 1 S𝑡𝑡 ― 2 
20 ∆Mid𝑡𝑡=(α+β) 
21 
22 
2 Qt-1-α 2 Qt-2(1-2π)+εt (10) 
23 Where S is the spread of stock i at time t,  is the probability of a trade flow reversal. Midt is 
24 
25 the midpoint of the bid-ask spread of stock i at time t.  and  are the percentages of the half- 
26 
27 
spread attributable to adverse selection and inventory holding costs respectively. Since  and  
29 
𝑆𝑆 
31 are stated as proportions, the order processing component is equal to 1-(  +  ). 2 is the posted 
32 
33 half spread at time t-1. The public information component is captured by t. 
34 
35 If we consider that the inventory holding costs β is equal to 0, we can rewrite equation (10) 
37 
38 as follows: 
39 40 
∆P =
𝑠𝑠
∆Q +α
𝑠𝑠
Q +ε (11) 
41 t 2 
42 
t 2    t-1 t 
43 The order processing costs is then equal to 1-α. We use the Huang and Stoll (1997) model for 
44 
45 
46 reporting our main results because it separates the bid-ask spread into three rather than two 
47 
48 components. The PIN and MRR models are estimated to provide robustness to our spread 
49 
50 decomposition estimations. 
51 
52 
3.3 Event Study 
54 
55 The announcement date (day 0) is the day of the first bank loan announcement where the 
56 
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1 
2 
3 zero-leverage firm start to lever up. In terms of the short-term event period, we examine abnormal 
4 
5 
returns (ARs) for the announcement day [day 0], three-day period around the announcement day 
7 
8 [-1, +1], five-day period around the announcement day [−2, +2] and eleven-day period [-5, +5] 
9 
10 around the announcement days. For the long-term event period we calculate the event periods as 
11 
12 long as 180 days [-90, +90] around the announcement dates. More specifically, we estimate the 
14 
15 abnormal returns by using an economically market-adjusted model: 
16 
17 ARi,t=Ri,t-Rm,t (12) 
19 
20 Where ARi,t is the abnormal return earned by stock i at time t. Ri,t is the return on stock i at 
21 
22 time t, and Rm,t is the value-weighted market index return at time t. As a proxy for the market’s 
23 
24 return, we use the FTSE index returns for the examining period. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
25 
26 
of event window surrounding the event day can be calculated using the following formula: 
28 
29 CARi,t(-q,+q)=∑
S 
30 
31 
AR𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (13) 
32 Where q is equals to 1, 2, 5, 10, 20,. ..... 90 respectively, represents the different time period 
33 
34 during the event window. The standard t-test is used to test whether the ARi,t and CARi,t differ 
35 
36 significantly from zero. 
37 
38 
39 4. Empirical Results 
40 
41 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
42 
43 The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Panel A compare zero-leverage firms and 
44 
45 
all FTSE 350 firms. As the findings of most previous studies (e.g.: Faulkender & Petersen, 2006) 
47 
48 state, zero-leverage firms are smaller than their levered counterpart firms, with an average market 
49 
50 capitalization of approximately ₤3995 million as compared to ₤4231 million for all FTSE 350 
51 
52 firms. This result is in direct contrast to Strebulaev and Yang (2013), who believe that the existence 
54 
55 of zero-debt policy is independent of firm size. We believe the reason for the difference in results 
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1 
2 
3 is because they compare zero-leverage to almost zero leverage firms, which are similar in both 
4 
5 
debt capacity and market capitalization. 
7 
8 Furthermore, zero-leverage firms are less liquid then all FTSE 350 firms regardless of the 
9 
10 measure of liquidity. This is because zero-leverage firms have less information available due to 
11 
12 their lower market capitalization and their lack of information due to their non-exposure to debt 
14 
15 financing. Turning to the standard deviation of returns, for the two groups there is no significant 
16 
17 difference (1.250 for zero-debt firms and 1.231 for all firms). Panel B reports the descriptive 
18 
19 statistics on loan amounts. The amount of the initial loan is on average around ₤1537.29 million 
20 
21 
22 whereas the median is ₤248.92 million. The loan amounts are extremely variable reflected by the 
23 
24 excess skewness of the data, with a range of approximately ₤69004 million. 
25 
26 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
27 
28 
4.2 Univariate changes in share price 
30 
31 Table 2 exhibits the abnormal return associated with the announcement of initial bank 
32 
33 loans. Standard event study methodology is used to examine the share price behaviour 
34 
35 surrounding the announcement of initial loan announcements of zero-leverage firms. Our 
37 
38 analysis is based on an event window starting 90 days before the effective day and ending 90 
39 
40 days after the effective day. A long prior announcement window is used to examine if there is 
41 
42 any information leakage before the news. The null hypothesis is that the price is unchanged or 
43 
44 
45 reverts to the pre-announcement level. Panel A provides the abnormal return on the initial loan 
46 
47 and Panel B provides the abnormal return of all kinds of loans (including the second loan, third 
48 
49 loan and any subsequent loans after that) during our sample period. For the pre-announcement 
50 
51 
period, both of the groups are significantly positive from the 60 days prior to the announcement 
53 
54 day, and insignificantly different between the two groups. 
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1 
2 
3 Our findings are consistent with Chae (2005), there is some information leakage before 
4 
5 
both the initial and all loan announcements, and all loan announcements lead to a positive market 
7 
8 reaction. For initial loans, the significant positive return persists from day 0 to day 90, with the 
9 
10 two largest average abnormal return of 2.394% (t-statistic of 12.2), 1.645% (t-statistic of 7.44) 
11 
12 occurring on the effective date of announcement (day 0) and the first trading day after the 
14 
15 announcement (day 1) respectively. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) over various 
16 
17 event windows are also presented in Table 2. The average cumulative abnormal return of 9.005% 
18 
19 is observed over the 11-event day interval [-5, +5], with a highly significant t-value. Event 
20 
21 
22 windows [-2, +2] and [-1, +1] have CARs of 6.4 and 4.56 percent respectively which are highly 
23 
24 significant. In terms of all loans, on the announcement day the abnormal return is 2.125% with a 
25 
26 t-statistics of 10.25, which is significantly lower than the abnormal return of the initial loan. The 
27 
28 
positive abnormal return lasts for 90 days after the initial loan announcements, suggests that 
30 
31 positive excess returns are gained by zero-leverage firms over a long-term period. 
32 
33 Our results are strongly consistent with the information hypothesis. The positive information 
34 
35 (e.g. issuing of a loan by a reputable bank to invest in possible positive net present value projects) 
37 
38 causes increases in stock prices immediately and the effects could be permanent (Denis & Mihov, 
39 
40 2003). This is because bank lending decisions provide positive signals to equity market 
41 
42 participants. Moreover, the gains obtained by zero-leverage firms from the initial loan are more 
43 
44 
45 pronounced than any other subsequent loans. 
46 
47 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
48 
49 4.3 Trading volume effects of zero-leverage firms’ initial bank loan 
50 
51 
In this section we examine if the abnormal returns lead to significant enhancements of trading 
53 
54 volume. To isolate the short-run abnormal trading volume in the days around the announcement, 
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1 
2 
3 we employ the following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model. 
4 
5 Vol =η +γ +∑ +5𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 +  (14) 6 j,t 
7 
j,t j,t ―5 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
8 Where Volj,t refers to the logarithm of trading volume for stock j at time t, j is a 96*96 identity 
10 
11 matrix for captures the variation in trading volume across all zero-leverage companies in the 
12 
13 sample. j,t captures the variation in trading volume across all the companies in our sample. j,t 
14 
15 
captures the change in trading volume per day that is common across all the companies in our 
17 
18 sample. Dj,t is dummy variables for each trading day (t) in the event window [-5, +5]. The 
19 
20 coefficients of the 11 dummy variables, AVolj,t captures the abnormal trading volume during the 
21 
22 event interval [-5, +5], j,t is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2, 
24 
25 , γ, and AVol are the parameters to be estimated. Equation (14) is estimated by a fixed effects 
26 
27 panel estimator using the White (1980) heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix. The results 
28 
29 
30 are presented in panel A of Table 3. The positive and significant sign of all 11 dummy variables 
31 
32 confirm that there is a dramatic increase in trading volume around initial bank loan announcements. 
33 
34 From 5 days prior to the announcement day, the coefficient is positive (e.g.: day -5 is 0.094) with 
35 
36 
37 a corresponding t-statistics of 2.40. On the event day (day 0), AVol0 
38 
achieved its peak value of 
39 1.970, which is highly significant with a t-statistic of 11.48. Following the loan announcement, the 
40 
41 abnormal trading volume subsides from its peak but remains significant. During our short-run 
42 
43 event period, all coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
45 
46 In order to analyse the trading volume changes in the long-run, we construct a post/pre ratio 
47 
48 of standardized trading volume in the post announcement period [0, +90] to the standardized 
49 
50 volume in the pre-announcement period [-90, 0]. Standardized trading volume is defined as daily 
51 
52 
53 trading volume of the zero-leverage firm listed on the FTSE 350 index, divided by the total FTSE 
54 
55 350 index trading for the same day. The results of the long-term changes in trading volume are 
55 
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1 
2 
3 reported in Panel B of Table 3. The mean (median) Post/Pre ratio of standardized trading volume 
4 
5 
is 1.853 (1.648), the standard t-test statistic indicates that the increase in standardized trading 
7 
8 volume is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This result is consistent with the 
9 
10 information effect hypothesis, suggesting that the initial bank loan announcement of zero-leverage 
11 
12 firms leads to a permanent rise in trading volume. Hedge and McDermott (2003) and many other 
14 
15 studies state that based on the liquidity-motivated hypothesis, trading volume is negative related 
16 
17 with information asymmetry. Therefore, a permanent increase in trading volume will result in a 
18 
19 decrease in the bid-ask spread. In the next section we will analyse the impact of initial loan 
20 
21 
22 announcements on the bid-ask spread. 
23 
24 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
25 
26 4.4 Univariate Changes in overall bid-ask spreads 
27 
28 
We construct ratios of the daily average absolute, relative and effective bid-ask spreads over 
30 
31 various event windows during the pre and post initial bank loan announcements. The null 
32 
33 hypothesis that the spread ratio is equal to unity (indicating no change in the daily average time- 
34 
35 weighted spreads) is tested by a standard t-test. There is clear evidence from Table 4 that spreads 
37 
38 are significantly reduced after the announcement of the initial bank loan. For example, in the [-1, 
39 
40 +1] event window, the mean of absolute spreads ratio is 0.842 with a highly significant t-statistic 
41 
42 of – 3.25. It indicates that absolute spreads are significantly lower over the 3-trading day period 
43 
44 
45 centred on the announcement day. On the announcement day, the absolute bid-ask spread ratio is 
46 
47 0.867 (relative spread ratio is 0.803 and effective spread ratio is 0.877), which is smaller than 1 
48 
49 and significantly different from 0. In all event windows, all absolute spreads ratios are less than 1 
50 
51 
and highly significantly. The decline is also pronounced for the relative and effective spread. 
53 
54 Furthermore, bank loan announcements result in a decrease in spread that persists over 90 
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1 
2 
3 trading days after the loan is announced, the average absolute bid-ask spread ratio for the long- 
4 
5 
term period, [0, 90] period is 0.914 (0.925 and 0.954 for relative and effective spreads respectively) 
7 
8 although not at a statistically significant level (t-statistics=-0.98). However, there is a significant 
9 
10 increase in liquidity when we use the relative and effective measures of the bid-ask spread (-2.26 
11 
12 and -2.44 respectively). Given the advantages of the effective over the absolute bid-ask spread 
14 
15 discussed earlier in the paper, we can say with some confidence that loan announcements enhance 
16 
17 liquidity in the long run. 
18 
19 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
20 
21 
22 4.5 Robustness Test 
23 
24 We undertake robustness tests for liquidity by constructing ratios of daily return to volume 
25 
26 (RtoV ratio) and daily return to turnover, (RtoTR ratio) over various intervals to their counterparts 
27 
28 
in the event window of [-90 + 90]. The null hypothesis that the RtoV, RtoTR ratio is equal to unity. 
30 
31 From table 5, we see that both the RtoV and RtoTR ratios show a clear decrease over the event 
32 
33 window. For example, in the [-5, +5] interval the RtoV and RtoTR ratio is 0.941 and 0.958 
34 
35 respectively, although the RtoTR ratio is statistic insignificant. Since both RtoV, RtoTR ratios are 
37 
38 illiquidity ratios, the decrease of them indicates increases of liquidity in the post-announcement 
39 
40 period. In the [-1, +1] interval, the decrease is more pronounced, 0.899 and 0.849 for the RtoV, 
41 
42 RtoTR ratios respectively, with both ratios being highly significant. The most pronounced ratio is 
43 
44 
45 on the event day, 0.804 for RtoV and 0.848 for RtoTR respectively with high significance. 
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1 
2 
3 [INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4 
5 
4.6 Multivariate analysis of market liquidity changes 
7 
8 Table 6 provides our results for the log-linear pooled cross-sectional multivariate regression 
9 
10 analysis for initial bank loan announcements. We estimate a model for each of the five liquidity 
11 
12 measures: absolute spreads, relative spreads, effective spreads, and the two price impact ratios, 
14 
15 RtoV and RtoTR. Under the log-linear specification of equation (6), we are mainly concern with 
16 
17 the coefficient in the dummy variable, β1. The coefficient of the initial loan appears negative and 
18 
19 highly significant in the event period. The result suggests that the event news has enhanced 
20 
21 
22 liquidity regardless of the measure of liquidity that is used. For example, the absolute bid-ask 
23 
24 spread decreases on average by 9.3% in the post announcement period, after controlling for the 
25 
26 impact of trading volume, firm size, volatility and share price. In table 6 most of the control 
27 
28 
variables are consistent with findings documented in prior research, trading volume is negative 
30 
31 whereas volatility is positive related with liquidity. Interestingly however, the coefficient estimate 
32 
33 for the firm size is negative but statistical insignificant, suggesting that there is no statistical 
34 
35 relationship between firm size and liquidity. 
37 
38 [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
39 
40 4.7 Spread Components of zero-leverage firms around the announcement days 
41 
42 Table 7 reports the spread components for both zero-leverage firms and all firms around the 
43 
44 
45 announcement day. The Huang and Stoll (1997) two-way spread decomposition model 
46 
47 decomposes the spreads into two components, adverse selection plus inventory holding costs (λ) 
48 
49 and order processing cost (1-λ). We estimate the data 90 trading days before the initial loan 
51 
52 announcements and 90 trading days after the announcement day. We present the results of all 
53 
54 sample in Panel A, then divide our study sample according to the trade size in Panel B. Portfolio 
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1 
2 
3 1 includes stocks with the smallest trade size, portfolio 2 and 3 incorporates stocks with the median 
4 
5 
and largest trade size respectively. When we look across the percentage of adverse selection + 
7 
8 inventory holding costs (λ) in Panel A, the estimates of λ in the post-announcement period are 
9 
10 significantly smaller than the pre- announcement period for zero-leverage firms. For example, λ 
12 
13 before the initial loan announcement is 0.632 for all samples then drops to 0.547, after the 
14 
15 announcement and there are no significant changes for all FTSE 350 firms during the same period 
16 
17 (0.448 and 0.452). 
18 
19 
20 Turning to the results depend on the trade size, the overall pattern is that before the 
21 
22 announcement period, λ increase with the trade size (0.589, 0.590 and 0.663 for small, median and 
23 
24 large trades respectively). It is consistent with Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), informed traders 
26 
27 prefer to trade a larger size at any given price to maximize their trading profits, so the adverse 
28 
29 information component of the spread should increase with trade size. The results in Table 7 support 
30 
31 our hypothesis that the initial loan announcement leads to increasing liquidity, since the order 
32 
33 
processing costs is a fixed cost, we can conclude the adverse selection and inventory holding costs 
35 
36 decrease in monetary terms as a result of the news announcement. For more details about whether 
37 
38 adverse selection or inventory cost components are driving the decrease of spread or both of them, 
39 
40 we continue our study by applying Huang and Stoll (1997) three-way spread decomposition model. 
42 
43 [INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
44 
45 Table 8 reveals the spread components for both zero-leverage firms and all firms using the 
46 
47 three-way Huang and Stoll (1997) model. For all samples, the estimates of the adverse selection 
49 
50 are decreasing from 0.326 before the announcements to 0.299 after the announcements, the 
51 
52 estimates of inventory holding cost components drop from 0.348 to 0.307 after the initial loan 
53 
54 announcements. 
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1 
2 
3 Panel B presents the results by trade size. Same as before, the adverse selection component 
4 
5 
rises monotonically as trade size increases. The average percentage of adverse selection costs vary 
7 
8 from 0.293 for small trades to 0.315 for large trades. For the inventory costs, the coefficients are 
9 
10 0.445, 0.396 and 0.447 (with t-test 18.76, 14.14 and 16.83 respectively). After the announcement 
11 
12 of the initial loan, both α and β decrease for all three groups. Since we have concluded that the 
14 
15 initial loan announcements will lead to the decrease of spreads, the decline in spreads are attributed 
16 
17 to changes in both the adverse selection and inventory costs. Looking into the trade size and the 
18 
19 changes of every component, for small trades, adverse selection costs drop from 0.293 to 0.275, 
21 
22 for medium and large trades are 0.311 to 0.298, and 0.315 to 0.301 respectively, with the 
23 
24 corresponding change levels of 1.8%, 1.3% and 1.4%. The difference in medium and large trades 
25 
26 is not as significant as the small trades with medium trades. For inventory holding costs, the change 
28 
29 level is 1.7%, 1.6% and 1.1%. According to previous studies, even though the adverse selection 
30 
31 costs are increasing with the trade size, the information asymmetry problem is more influenced on 
32 
33 the small trade size. The findings in table 7 and 8 document that adverse selection components are 
34 
35 
decreasing with the announcements of the initial loan. 
37 
38 [INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
39 
40 4.8 Regression Results between Spread Components and Firm Characteristics 
41 
42 In this section, we use the ordinary least squares method to obtain some preliminary insights 
44 
45 on the cross-sectional determinants of spread components for zero-leverage firms around the initial 
46 
47 loan announcement period. Table 9 (10) presents the two (three) way Huang and Stoll (1997) 
48 
49 model. For the two-way Huang and Stoll (1997) model, the dependent variables are adverse 
51 
52 selection plus inventory holding costs (λ), and order processing costs (1-λ). Like the previous 
53 
54 section, the regressions are run for small, medium and large trades separately. Specifically, the 
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1 
2 
3 regression takes the following forms: 
4 
5 
6 Lnλ=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A+εt (15) 
7 
8 Ln(1-λ)=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A+εt (16) 
9 
10 Where λ and 1-λ is the adverse selection plus inventory holding costs and order processing 
12 
13 costs respectively. Independent variables are same as we have defined before. 
14 
15 Table 9 shows that for all of λ there is a strong negative correlation with the Initial dummy 
16 
17 
18 variable. For all samples in Panel A, the coefficient is -0.056 with a t-statistic of -3.43. Similar 
19 
20 quantitative results are obtained in Panel B, where the estimated significant coefficient for λ is - 
21 
22 0.097, 0.019 and -0.004 for small, medium and large trades respectively. These results indicate 
24 
25 that the initial loan announcements appears to have an overwhelming negative effect on λ. 
26 
27 Furthermore, the correlation between λ and the initial dummy are fairly large in the small trades, 
28 
29 
and the correlation is decreasing with trading size. It indicates that the initial loan announcement 
31 
32 has more influence on the small trades rather than medium and large trades. 
33 
34 For our second model where order processing costs (1-λ) act as a dependent variable, all 
35 
36 
37 coefficients of the initial variable are not significant. This is consistent with the results which we 
38 
39 have mentioned previously, that there are no statistical relationships between the initial loan 
40 
41 announcement and order processing costs. The reduction of spreads after the initial loan 
42 
43 
announcements are mainly due to the decrease of λ. The results also show that the coefficients for 
45 
46 trading volume are negative and significant in all order processing cost models regardless of trade 
47 
48 size. This confirms the results of Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), which state that higher trading 
49 
50 
volume is not connected with changes in order processing costs. Standard deviation of stock prices, 
52 
53 which proxy volatility are positively related with λ but negative and insignificantly associated with 
54 
55 the order processing cost. Firm size is positive and significant with order processing costs but 
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1 
2 
3 insignificant with adverse selection plus inventory costs in all four models. For share price, the 
4 
5 
estimates are highly significant and confirm an inverse relation between λ and share price. One 
7 
8 possible explanation is that the lowest priced stocks have a significantly smaller market value than 
9 
10 higher priced stocks, and they tend to be less widely followed by the market and are subject to a 
11 
12 
greater degree of asymmetric information. 
14 
15 [INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
16 
17 Table 10 summarizes the results of the firm determinants and the three spread components, 
18 
19 
adverse selection (α), inventory holding costs (β) and order processing costs (1-α-β). The spread 
21 
22 components are computed by using the three ways Huang and Stoll (1997) model. For all samples 
23 
24 in Panel A, similar with two-way decomposition model, order processing costs are negligible in 
25 
26 
every subsample with an initial loan announcement. The coefficient between adverse selection and 
28 
29 the initial loan announcements dummy is -0.024 with t-statistic of -4.33. The coefficient between 
30 
31 inventory holding costs and Initial is -0.006 and significant at the 10% level. Comparing with 
32 
33 previous results, this implies that although both λ and α are negatively related with the initial loan 
35 
36 announcements, the adverse selection components account for a larger portion of the spread 
37 
38 decrease. 
39 
40 Panel B reports the regression results for the panel data regressions with three spread 
42 
43 components as dependent variables sorted by trade size. The correlations between adverse 
44 
45 selection components and initial loan announcements are fairly significant in the first two 
46 
47 subsamples (-0.029 for small and -0.015 for medium trades) and are negligible in the third group. 
49 
50 It reveals that the decrease of information asymmetry is more pronounced in the small and medium 
51 
52 trades when a zero-leverage firm has been issued an initial bank loan. It also suggests that the level 
53 
54 of decrease falls when the trade size increases. 
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1 
2 
3 Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2001) finds that the adverse selection and stock return 
4 
5 
volatility are positively and significantly related. Our results reaffirm their findings. For all 
7 
8 samples, the correlation between them is 0.012 with a t statistic of 3.03. The reduction is also seen 
9 
10 in the level of the changes between the standard deviation and the inventory holding costs. The 
11 
12 estimated coefficient for inventory holding costs is 0.040 for all samples, 0.076 for the small trades 
14 
15 group, 0.041 and 0.019 for medium and large trade groups respectively. The positive correlation 
16 
17 between the standard deviation of stock return and inventory holding components indicates that 
18 
19 the more volatile the stock, the greater the inventory holding problem faced by the market maker. 
20 
21 
22 In our zero-leverage samples, the coefficient between market capitalization and α is -0.003,- 
23 
24 0.000 and -0.001 with the t statistics of -2.77, -1.06 and 1.65 respectively. In our sample, it only 
25 
26 significant in the small trade size. Moreover, the correlation between the adverse selection and 
28 
29 trading volume is -0.010, -0.005 and -0.003 for small, median and large trading sizes. This supports 
30 
31 the evidence of our result in section 4.3 and many other previous research, that more highly traded 
32 
33 stocks have fewer information problems. All coefficients on the trading volume have a strong 
34 
35 
negative correlation with the order processing costs and are highly significant, advocating that 
37 
38 fixed costs are diminishing when market makers trade more shares. 
39 
40 [INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
41 
42 4.9: Robustness Test: Regression of Spread Components by MRR model and PIN Model 
44 
45 In this section we replicate the single equation in section 4.8 using two alternative proxies, 
46 
47 the MRR model (1997) and PIN, to test whether our findings are driven by methodological 
48 
49 differences. Given that both the MRR and PIN models are two-way spread decomposition models, 
51 
52 we compare the results with the two-way Huang and Stoll model. The results are displayed on 
53 
54 Tables 11 (MRR model) and 12 (PIN model). 
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1 
2 
3 The spread component estimation is sensitive to model specifications, because the estimates 
4 
5 
of the adverse selection component from the MRR model are generally higher than our estimate 
7 
8 from the Huang and Stoll model, whereas the estimation from the PIN model is lower. The first 
9 
10 column in Table 11 presents the relationship between adverse selection estimated by the MRR 
11 
12 model and firm determinants. Again, for Panel A with small trade sizes, the estimated coefficients 
14 
15 of the adverse selection component is -0.093 with a t-statistic of-3.13, -0.034 and -0.037 for 
16 
17 medium and large trades respectively. Order processing cost coefficients are insignificant with 
18 
19 initial loan announcements across the three groups. 
20 
21 
22 For the PIN model, the correlations between α and the initial loan dummy variable are fairly 
23 
24 small in all three subsamples (-0.008, -0.002 and -0.001 for small, medium and large trades). So 
25 
26 we cannot conclude that the adverse selection component (as measured by the PIN model) of the 
28 
29 spread decreases with the announcement of the initial bank loan. We think it is due to the 
30 
31 misclassification between the buyer and seller-initiated trades. 
32 
33 [INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
34 
35 
5. Conclusion 
37 
38 We examine stock market reactions and liquidity effects following the initial bank loan 
39 
40 announcement of zero-leverage firms. Using a sample of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 
41 
42 350 index over the time period of 2000-2015, we find evidence of a significant and permanent 
44 
45 stock price increase as a result of the initial debt announcement. The announcement of an initial 
46 
47 bank loan causes a positive reaction in the stock price of borrowing firms, which is consistent with 
48 
49 the financial intermediation hypothesis. This suggests that bank relations allow zero-leverage firms 
51 
52 to build-up reputation to encounter credit constraints and that financial intermediaries play a 
53 
54 unique role in monitoring and signal effects to the market. 
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1 
2 
3 We also find that the announcement of the news results in a sustained increase in trading 
4 
5 
volume and liquidity. The improvement in liquidity continues to persist once we control for stock 
7 
8 price and trading volume effects in both the short and long run. Our results are robust across five 
9 
10 alternative  measures  of  liquidity.  When  we  decompose  the  bid-ask  spread  into  its  three 
11 
12 components we find that information asymmetry is driving the enhancement in liquidity rather 
14 
15 than changes in order processing and inventory holding costs. 
16 
17 We believe that our findings can be attributed to the information cost/liquidity hypothesis. 
18 
19 For policy makers and governments, bank monitoring improves the measurement of information 
20 
21 
22 asymmetry through a richer information environment, greater monitoring and more corporate 
23 
24 disclosure. Avenues of further research along the lines of how the impact of the news affects 
25 
26 market value of the companies would be very interesting from both a finance and accounting 
27 
28 
perspective. 
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41 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
42 
43 Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for our data sample. The sample consists of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 
44 350 that undertook an initial loan during the time period of 2000-2015. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics on borrowing zero-leverage firms. Market capitalization is calculated as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization measured by 
pounds (price multiplied by the number of shares traded). Absolute spread is defined as ask price minus bid price. Relative spread 
46 is defined as ask price minus bid price, then divided by quote midpoint. Effective spread is defined as two times trade price minus 
47 quote midpoint. The midpoint is ask price minus bid price divided by two. Panel B provides the disclosed amount to be borrowed 
48 by the zero-leverage firm measured in pounds. 
49 
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30 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 . 
21 
22 
23 Table 2. Price effects associated with initial bank loans of zero-leverage firms. 
24 Table 2 provides the price and return changes from the pre-announcement to the post-announcement period. The sample consists 
25 of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 350 that undertook an initial bank loan during the time period of 2000-2015. Panel A 
26 presents the daily average returns (AAR) surrounding the initial bank loan announcements. T-statistics are presented to show if 
27 sample loans’ AAR are significantly different from zero. Event day (day zero) presents the day of the bank loan announcement. 
28 Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, ***significance at 1%, **significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 29 
Event Day Panel A: Initial Loan 
31 (N=96) 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Panel B: All Loans 
(N=365) 
STOCK PRICE(₤) 507.633  523.435  
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
RETURN (%) 
 
OF 
1.250  1.231  
TRADING 
VOLUME(MILLION) 
6325  6520  
ABSOLUTE 
SPREAD 
2.537  2.031  
RELATIVE 
SPREAD (%) 
0.015  0.011  
EFFECTIVE 
SPREAD (%) 
0.412  0.369  
PANEL B: LOANS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Mean 
(Million) 
Median 
(Million) 
Std.Dev Min Max 
(%) (Million) (Million) 
Skewness 
INITIAL LOAN 1537.29 248.92 7916.28 44.88 69049 7.94 
 
 AAR (%) T-stat AAR (%) T-Stat 
(-90,0) 0.167 2.32*** 0.142 1.91* 
(-80,0) 0.212 2.60*** -0.017 -0.98 
(-70,0) -0.327 -2.57*** 0.006 1.43* 
(-60,0) 0.519 3.46*** 0.251 2.25*** 
(-50,0) 0.392 2.48** 0.194 1.98*** 
(-40,0) 0.273 2.46** 0.207 1.46* 
(-30,0) 0.256 2.97*** 0.223 2.03** 
(-20,0) 0.135 2.03* 0.224 2.55*** 
(-10,0) 0.167 2.56*** 0.339 2.87** 
-5 0.268 3.18*** 0.199 3.01*** 
-4 0.196 2.08* 0.284 2.86** 
-3 0.103 2.44** 0.197 3.11** 
-2 0.449 3.27*** 0.198 3.48*** 
-1 0.517 2.29* 0.205 2.77** 
0 2.394 12.20*** 2.125 10.25*** 
1 1.645 7.44*** 1.378 4.99*** 
2 1.395 7.73*** 1.198 4.38*** 
3 0.816 2.49** 0.709 2.51*** 
4 0.657 2.72*** 0.544 1.57* 
5 0.565 1.69* 0.599 2.54*** 
(-1, +1) 4.556 6.06*** 3.708 5.17*** 
(-2, +2) 6.400 4.55*** 5.104 3.34*** 
(-5,+5) 9.005 4.37*** 7.636 5.95*** 
(0,10) 0.258 2.25* 0.201 1.97* 
(0,20) 0.428 2.91*** 0.299 2.21*** 
(0,30) 0.152 2.58*** 0.105 1.99*** 
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2 
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6 
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9 
10 Table 3. Short and long-run trading volume affects around the initial loan announcement 
11 
12 Panel A: Short-run trading volume. 
13 
14 Panel A of table 3 provides the short-run trading volume ratio between the pre-announced and post-announced period. The sample 
15 consists of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 350 that undertook an initial bank loan during the time period of 2000-2015. 
16 A pooled time series regression is estimated with the White (1980) covariance matrix to investigate the volume patterns around the 
17 bank debt announcements as follows: 
18 
19 
Vol  = + +∑ +5𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
20 Where Volj,t refers to the logarithm of trading volume for stock j at time t, j is a 96*96 identity matrix for captures the variation in 
trading volume across all zero-leverage companies in the sample. j,t captures the variation in trading volume 
across all the companies in our sample. j,t captures the change in trading volume per day that is common across all the companies 22 in our sample. Dj,t is dummy variables for each trading day (t) in the event window [-5, +5]. The coefficients of the 11 dummy 
23 variables, AVolj,t captures the abnormal trading volume during the event interval [-5, +5], εi is a random disturbance term with a 
24 mean of zero and a variance of σ2, , γ, and AVol are the parameters to be estimated. Two tailed tests of significance are reported 
25 as follows, ***significance at 1%, **significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
26 
27 
28 PARAMETER ESTIMATE T-STAT 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 Panel B: Long-run trading volume. 
46 
47 Panel B of table 4 provides the long-run trading volume ratio between pre-announced period and post-announced period. The 
48 sample consists of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 350 that undertook an initial bank loan during the time period of 2000-2015. Standardized trading volume is defined as daily trading volume in shares divided by the total FTSE 350 trading volume 
for the same day. Standardized trading volumes are computed for the pre-announcement [-90, 0] and the post-announcement period 
50 [0, +90]. The t-statistic is constructed to test the null hypothesis that the standardized trading volume is unchanged in the pre- 
51 announcement period as compared with the post-announcement period. Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, *** 
52 significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
53 
54 Variable Standardized Trading Volume 
55 Mean (pre-announced) 0.0347% 
56 Mean (post-announced) 0.0643% 
(0.40) 0.161 2.14* 0.118 2.48*** 
(0,50) 0.170 1.76* 0.160 1.83* 
(0,60) 0.151 0.82 0.100 1.56*** 
(0,70) 0.319 1.62* 0.023 1.44* 
(0,80) 0.167 2.43** 0.089 1.08 
(0,90) 0.155 2.82** 0.197 2.01** 
 
η 0.014 16.57** 
γ 0.000587 11.21** 
AVOL-5 0.094 2.40** 
AVOL-4 0.091 1.57** 
AVOL-3 0.002 1.43* 
AVOL-2 0.009 1.94** 
AVOL-1 0.084 3.71** 
AVOL0 1.970 11.48*** 
AVOL1 1.152 6.34** 
AVOL2 0.272 2.98** 
AVOL3 0.361 2.71** 
AVOL4 0.198 1.98* 
AVOL5 0.204 1.87* 
ADJUST R2=26.1% 
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15 
39 
  
 
 
1  
2 
3 Median (pre-announced) 0.0227% 
4 Median (post-announced) 0.0374% 
5 Mean (post/pre ratio) 1.853 
6 Median (post/pre ratio) 1.648 
7 t-test 2.56** 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 Table 4. Bid-Ask spread ratios. 
13 
14 Table 4 provides the spread ratio between pre-announced period and post-announced period. The sample consists of 96 zero- leverage firms listed on the FTSE 350 that undertook an initial bank loan during the time period of 2000-2015. Liquidity is measured 
by the absolute, relative and effective spread. The spread ratio for each bank debt in the sample is defined as the ratio of average 
16 spreads measured over the indicated event time interval to average measured over the post-bank loan announcement period. 
17 Absolute spread is defined as ask price minus bid price. Relative spread is defined as ask price minus bid price, then divided by 
18 quote midpoint. Effective spread is defined as two times trade price minus quote midpoint. The midpoint is the average between 
19 the ask and bid prices. The null hypothesis that that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to unity is tested using a standard t-test. 
20 *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 Table 5 Price impact ratios. 
36 
37 Table 5 provides the robustness test for liquidity between the pre-announced period and post-announced period. The sample consists 
38 of 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 350 that undertook an initial bank loan during the time period of 2000-2015.Liquidity is measured by the RtoV (Amihud, 2002) and the RtoTR ratio (Florackis et al., 2011). The RtoV ratio is defined as the average daily 
absolute stock return to its trading volume. The RtoTR ratio is defined as the average daily absolute stock return to its turnover. 
40 The null hypothesis that that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to unity and is tested using a standard t-test. *** significance at 
41 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
42 
43 RtoV =
 1 
∑D𝑖𝑖 |R𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑|   44 i D𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 = 1 V𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 
RtoTR = 
1 
∑D𝑖𝑖 |R𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑|   45 i 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
D𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 = 1TR𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 
Event Day Absolute 
Spread 
T-test Relative 
Spread 
T-test Effective 
Spread 
T-test 
0 0.867 -3.33*** 0.803 -3.00** 0.877 -2.08** 
(-1,+1) 0.842 -3.25*** 0.874 -2.05** 0.869 -3.01** 
(-2,+2) 0.839 -2.04** 0.882 -1.54* 0.842 -2.03** 
(-3,+3) 0.938 -1.24 0.900 -1.97** 0.836 -0.71 
(-4,+4) 0.901 -1.25* 0.892 -2.38** 0.910 -3.04*** 
(-5,+5) 0.896 -2.11** 0.902 -3.67*** 0.905 -2.44** 
(0,+10) 0.917 -1.37* 0.896 -2.10** 0.894 -1.01 
(0,+30) 0.903 -0.41 0.919 -1.05 0.983 -2.10** 
(0,+60) 0.908 -1.57* 0.878 -1.49* 0.933 -3.28*** 
(0,+90) 0.914 -0.98 0.925 -2.26** 0.954 -2.44** 
 
Event Day RtoV 
ratio 
T-test RtoTR 
ratio 
T-test 
0 0.804 -2.08** 0.848 -3.56*** 
(-1,+1) 0.899 -2.65** 0.849 -2.39** 
(-2,+2) 0.862 -2.16** 0.870 -1.43* 
(-3,+3) 0.834 -1.98** 0.945 -1.65** 
(-4,+4) 0.902 -1.45* 0.923 -0.97 
(-5,+5) 0.941 -1.99** 0.958 -1.74* 
(0,+10) 0.897 -1.73* 0.899 -1.69** 
(0,+30) 0.963 -1.56* 0.908 -1.03 
(0,+60) 0.954 -1.99** 0.927 -1.07 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 Table 6. Multivariate analysis of changes in stock liquidity. 
7 
8 Table 6 provides the multivariate analysis of the long-term liquidity impact on initial loan announcement. The sample consists of 
9 96 zero-leverage firms listed on the FTSE 350 that undertook an initial bank loan during the time period of 2000-2015. A log-linear 10 pooled time series cross-sectional multivariate analysis of quoted spread and price impact ratio is estimated as follows : 
11 LogLiqi,t=β0+β1Initiali,t+β2LogVoli,t+β3LogSizei,t+β4StdDevi,t+β5LogPricei,t+β6LogL/Ai,t+εi,t. 
12 
13 Regression variables are defined as: loglig represents the natural logarithm of the average daily five liquidity benchmarks, absolute 
14 spreads, relative spreads, effective spreads, RtoV ratio and RtoTR ratios for stock i in time period t. independent variables include 
15 the dummy variables Initial, which equals 1 in the post-announcement period and 0 otherwise. logVol, is the daily trading volume 
16 of the stock, LogSize captures the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the sample firm. LogStdDev represents daily 
return volatility in the time period t. LogPrice, is the natural logarithm of the stock i’s daily closing price. logL/A ratio is the 
logarithm of loan amount to total asset of zero-leverage firms. Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, *** 
18 significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
19 . 
20 
21 
22 
23 Dependent Variables 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 Table 7 Spread components for zero-leverage and all FTSE 350 firms using the Huang and Stoll two-way 
39 model. 
41 
Table 7 reports a comparison of bid-ask spread components of zero-leverage firm before and after the announcement of initial bank 42 
loans. The adverse selection (α) plus inventory costs components (β) is estimated by the Huang and Stoll (1997) model. They also 43 
estimate  the  order  processing  costs  by  computing  1-(α+β).  We  estimate  the  data  90  trading  days  before  the  initial  loan 44 
announcement day and 90 trading days after the announcement day. For all firms, we calculate the average bid-ask spread 45 
components on the same days corresponds to the zero-leverage firms. The results for the whole sample are reported in Panel A and 46 
the results by trade size are presented in Panel B. Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, *** significance at 1%, ** 
47 
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
48 
49 Panel A: Spread Components Using Two Ways 
50 Zero-leverage Firms 
51 
52 
Initial loans Before 
α+β (%) 0.632 
T-stat 
18.67*** 
After 
0.547 
T-stat 
19.67*** 
53 All FTSE 350 Firms    
54 Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
55 α+β(%) 0.448 5.44*** 0.452 6.73*** 
Independent 
Variables 
Absolute 
Spread 
T-stat Relative 
Spread 
T-stat Effective 
Spread 
T-stat RtoV T-stat RtoTR T-stat 
C -3.268 -3.08*** -5.465 -6.78*** -3.669 -2.07* 0.037 2.08** 0.0056 0.44 
Initial -0.093 -6.29*** -0.037 -3.56*** -0.024 -1.24 -0.018 -1.64 -0.026 -3.23*** 
Volume -0.028 -5.83*** -0.041 -3.17*** -0.011 -1.99* 0.669 8.28*** -0.0005 -0.75 
Firm Size -0.007 -1.12 -0.003 -0.81 -0.003 -0.83 -0.376 -6.43*** 0.009 0.98 
StdDev 0.068 3.49*** 0.027 2.13* 0.027 2.18* 0.0001 0.74 -0.004 -1.73* 
Price -0.003 -1.27 -0.009 -1.00 0.002 1.29 0.014 1.47 0.026 2.18** 
L/A 0.004 1.07 0.001 0.93 0.0002 0.78 0.000 0.63 0.000 0.77 
(0,+90) 0.912 -0.93 0.934 -0.86 
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1 
2 
3 Panel B: Spread Components by Trade Size Two Ways 
4 Small Trades 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Table 8 Spread components by trade size for zero-leverage firms and all FTSE 350 firms using the Huang 
16 
and Stoll three-way model. 
18 Table 8 reports a comparison of the components of the bid-ask spread of zero-leverage firm before and after the announcement of 
19 initial bank loans. The adverse selection (α), inventory costs components (β) and order processing costs (1-α-β) are estimated  by 
20 the Huang and Stoll (1997) model. We compute the data 90 trading days before the initial loan announcement day and 90 trading 
21 days after announcement days. For all firms, we calculate the average bid-ask spread components on the same days corresponds to 
22 the zero-leverage firms. We report the whole sample results in Panel A and the results by trade size in Panel B. Two tailed tests of 
23 significance are reported as follows, *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
24 
25 Panel A: Spread Components Using Three Ways Method 
26 Zero-leverage Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Panel B: Spread Components by Trade Size Using Three Ways Method 
36 Small Trades 
37 Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
38 α(%) 0.293 21.04*** 0.274 18.92*** 
39 β(%) 0.445 18.76*** 0.428 22.66*** 
40 Median Trades  
Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
α+β(%) 0.589 21.11*** 0.500 19.96*** 
Median Trades     
Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
α+β(%) 0.590 18.39*** 0.527 15.36*** 
Large Trades     
Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
α+β(%) 0.663 10.42*** 0.617 6.40*** 
 
27 Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
28 α(%) 0.326 23.13
*** 0.299 21.26*** 
29 β(%) 0.348 25.28*** 0.307 19.00*** 
30 All FTSE 350 Firms  
31 Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
32 α(%) 0.213 11.76*** 0.224 10.05*** 
33 β(%) 0.327 9.25** 0.330 11.14*** 
34      
 
41 Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
42 α(%) 0.311 16.32
*** 0.298 13.50*** 
43 
β(%) 0.396 14.14*** 0.390 19.19*** 
44 
Large Trades     
Initial Loans Before T-stat After T-stat 
45 α(%) 0.315 14.11*** 0.301 18.40*** 
46 β(%) 0.447 16.83*** 0.436 16.12*** 
47  
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
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1 
2 
3 Table 9 Regression of spread components using the two-way Huang and Stoll model. 
4 
5 Table 9 presents the OLS regression results for the determinants of the adverse selection plus inventory cost, and order processing costs from 2000 to 2015, 
6 For the zero-leverage firms which announce their initial bank loans. The dependent variable is the adverse selection plus inventory cost (λ), and order processing costs (1-λ), 
7 estimated using the Huang and Stoll (1997) two ways spread decomposition model. The independent variables include the dummy variable INITIAL which denotes 
the initial loan of zero-leverage firms. The logarithm of trading volume (VOLUME), the logarithm of daily average market capitalization (SIZE), the logarithm of daily return standard 
deviation (STDDEV), the logarithm of daily average share price (PRICE), and the loan amount to total asset ratio (L/A ratio).We report the entire sample results in Panel A 
9 and the results by trade size in Panel B. Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, *** significance at 1%,** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
10 
11 Lnλ=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 
12 Ln(1-λ)=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 
13    
14 Dependent   Independent Variables  
15 Variables 
16 
C Initial Volume Size StdDev Price L/A Ratio 
Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
17 Panel A: Regression of Spread Components 
18 
1-λ 3.205 6.04*** 0.004 0.98 -0.058 -5.47*** 0.056 4.25*** -0.003 -1.36 -0.002 -1.08 0.002 0.98 
20   Panel B: Regression of Spread Components by Trade Size  
21 Small 
22 Median 23 
24 Large 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
λ 3.024 8.68*** -0.097 -3.09*** -0.004 -2.44** -0.000 -1.38*** 0.030 2.50*** -0.005 -2.61** 0.023 1.85* 
1-λ 4.331 9.49*** 0.001 1.31 -0.025 -4.24*** 0.037 2.73*** -0.001 -1.65 -0.000 -1.58 0.001 0.46 
λ 6.320 12.45*** -0.019 -2.83*** -0.003 -1.69 -0.001 -1.93* 0.009 3.04** -0.001 -2.19* 0.006 0.97 
1-λ 5.124 6.27*** 0.000 0.45 -0.055 -2.20** 0.068 2.05** -0.004 -0.25 -0.005 -0.45 0.000 1.45 
λ 3.088 9.33*** -0.004 -1.96** -0.007 -1.05 -0.000 -1.51 0.004 1.83* -0.013 -1.08 0.001 0.73 
1-λ 3.740 1.11 0.000 0.84 -0.073 -2.33** 0.059 2.16** -0.000 -0.71 -0.001 -1.43 0.000 0.48 
8 
All λ 2 760 7 55*** 0 056 3 43*** 0 005 3 06*** 0 001 1 88* 0 013 2 09* 0 004 1 98* 0 015 1 24 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 Table 10 Regression of spread components using the three-way Huang and Stoll model. 
6 
7 
8 Table 10 presents the OLS regression results for the determinants of the adverse selection (), inventory cost (), and order processing costs for a period 
9 from 2000 to 2015 for zero-leverage firms which announced their initial bank loans. The dependent variable is the adverse selection (α), inventory cost (β), 
10 and order processing costs (1-α-β), estimated using Huang and Stoll (1997) three ways spread decomposition model. The independent variables include the 
11 dummy variable INITIAL, which denotes the initial loan of zero-leverage firms. The logarithm of trading volume (VOLUME), the logarithm of daily average market 
capitalization (SIZE), the logarithm of daily return standard deviation (STDDEV), the logarithm of daily average share price (PRICE), and the loan amount to total asset 
ratio (L/A ratio).We report the entire sample results in Panel A and the results by trade size in Panel B. Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, 
13 *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
14 
15 Lnα=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 
16 Lnβ=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 
17 Ln(1-α-β)=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 
18    
19 Dependent   Independent Variables  
20 Variables 
21 
C Initial Volume Size StdDev Price L/A Ratio 
Coef T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
22  Panel A: Regression of Spread Components  
23 β 3.888 12.04*** -0.006 2.14* -0.020 -4.83*** -0.004 -2.46** 0.040 3.14*** -0.007 -0.56 -0.006 -0.47 
24 1-α-β 3.729 9.03*** 0.001 1.64 -0.066 -2.98** 0.037 1.04 -0.002 -1.63* -0.001 -1.56 0.000 0.83 
25  Panel B: Regression of Spread Components by Trade Size  
26 
27 Small 
28 
29 
30 Median 
31 
32 Large 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
α 2.400 17.58*** -0.029 -4.03*** -0.010 -1.44 -0.003 -2.77** 0.023 4.29*** -0.004 -2.82** 0.011 1.54 
β 4.253 9.08*** -0.012 -2.25** -0.024 -2.03* -0.001 -2.24** 0.076 1.07 -0.009 -1.66 -0.013 -1.03 
1-α-β 2.368 11.63*** 0.003 0.58 -0.093 -3.18*** 0.020 2.25** -0.002 -1.09 -0.001 -1.48 0.000 0.87 
α 2.403 8.09*** -0.015 -3.98*** -0.005 -1.24 -0.000 -1.06 0.010 3.54*** 0.000 2.13* 0.003 1.24 
β 3.050 9.40*** -0.003 -3.92*** -0.018 -1.68* -0.002 -2.10* 0.041 1.99* -0.004 -1.02 -0.009 -0.98 
1-α-β 4.584 11.00*** 0.000 1.03 -0.054 -3.66*** 0.041 2.73** -0.001 -1.58 -0.002 -0.77 0.000 0.45 
α 2.809 6.41*** -0.007 -1.34 -0.003 -0.83 -0.001 -1.65 0.008 2.44** 0.003 2.63** 0.001 0.47 
β 1.054 4.55*** -0.001 -2.67** -0.015 -2.78** -0.004 -0.96 0.019 1.48 -0.004 -0.66 -0.003 -0.87 
1-α-β 6.038 7.67*** 0.001 0.37 -0.076 -3.25*** 0.044 3.96*** -0.001 -1.05 -0.001 -0.98 0.000 0.85 
40 
Table 11 Regression of spread components using the MRR model. 
All α 1 306 11 58*** -0 024 -4 33** -0 003 -1 32 -0 000 -1 08 0 012 3 03** -0 003 -1 32 0 008 1 33 
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1 
2 
3 
4 Table 11 presents the OLS regression results for the determinants of the adverse selection and order processing costs, which are estimated using Madhavan et al (1997) 
5 spread decomposition model (MRR model). Over the period of 2000 to 2015, for zero-leverage firms which announced their initial bank loans. The independent variables 
6 include the dummy variable (INITIAL), the initial loan of zero-leverage firms. The logarithm of trading volume (VOLUME), the logarithm of daily average market 
capitalization ( SIZE), the logarithm of daily return standard deviation (STDDEV), the logarithm of daily average share price (PRICE), and the loan amount to total asset 
8 ratio (L/A ratio).. Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, 
*** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
9 Lnλ=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 
10 Ln(1-λ)=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A +εt 11    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Table 12. Regression of spread components using the PIN model. 
40 
41 Table 12 presents the OLS regression results for the determinants of the informed trading costs and non-informed trading costs of share spread, which are estimated 
12 Dependent  Independent Variables  
13 Variables  C  Initial Volume  Size  StdDev  Price  L/A Ratio 
14  Coef.  T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef.  T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef.  T-stat Coef. T-stat 
15  Panel A: Regression of Spread Components  
16 All λ 2.607 7.18*** -0.045 -3.58*** -0.010 -5.84*** -0.005 -2.94** 0.037 3.96*** -0.008 -1.85* 0.000 0.96 
17 1-λ 6.551 6.35*** 0.000 0.96 -0.059 -8.93*** 0.033 3.07** -0.000 -1.14 -0.003 -0.97 0.000 1.89* 
18   Panel B: Reg 
19 Small 
ression  
λ 
of Spread  
2.064 
Component 
6.88*** 
s by Trade  
-0.093 
Size  
-3.13*** 
 
-0.006 
 
-2.65** 
 
-0.005 
 
-1.18 
 
0.049 
 
4.65*** 
 
-0.004 
 
-1.02 
 
0.010 
 
0.78 
20 1-λ 3.448 3.41*** 0.004 1.16 -0.063 -7.45*** 0.012 1.90* -0.000 -1.26 0.016 0.83 0.024 1.00 
21 Median λ 
4.001 6.86*** -0.034 -3.59*** -0.005 -3.37*** -0.009 -1.18 0.014 5.09*** -0.010 -1.99* 0.003 1.24 
23 1-λ 3.298 1.71* 0.002 1.16 -0.041 -3.11*** 0.061 1.00 -0.000 -1.27 0.009 0.79 0.001 0.90 
24 Large λ 1.008 7.65*** -0.037 -2.88*** -0.013 -1.68 -0.038 -2.54** 0.016 3.34*** -0.013 -1.65 0.000 0.73 
25 1-λ 3.068 0.52 0.000 0.75 -0.048 -6.33*** 0.035 2.48** -0.003 -1.60 0.000 1.03 0.000 0.24 
26  
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
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1 
2 
3 using the probability of information-based trading (PIN model) by Easley et al. (1997). Over the time period of 2000 to 2015, for zero-leverage firms that announce 
4 their initial bank loans. The independent variables include the dummy variable INITIAL, which denotes the initial loan of zero-leverage firm.  The logarithm of trading volume 
5 (VOLUME),the logarithm of daily average market capitalization (SIZE), the logarithm of daily return standard deviation (STDDEV), the logarithm of daily average share price 
6 (PRICE), and the loan amount to total asset ratio (L/A ratio). Two tailed tests of significance are reported as follows, *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and *  significance 
7 at 10%. 
8 LnPIN=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price+µ6L/A+εt 
9 Ln(1-PIN)=µ0+µ1Initial+µ2Vol+µ3Size+µ4StdDev+µ5Price++µ6L/A+εt 
10 
11 Dependent   Independent Variables  
12 Variables 
13 
C   Initial  Volume  Size   StdDev  Price  L/A Ratio 
Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef.  T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef.  T-stat Coef. T-stat 
14  Panel A: Regression of Spread Components  
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
All PIN 11.88 9.65*** -0.004 0.95 -0.003 -1.24 -0.103 -3.25*** 0.017 3.96*** -0.000 -0.74 0.018 1.05 
 1-PIN 7.52 5.33*** -0.007 1.88* -0.000 -0.97 0.045 3.23*** -0.056 -2.89*** 0.003 1.28 0.006 1.30 
  Panel B: Re 
Small 
gression o 
PIN 
f Spread Components  
-1.357 -3.05** 
by Trade  
-0.008 
Size  
-1.66 
 
-0.005 
 
-1.38 
 
-0.030 
 
-3.58*** 
 
0.004 
 
1.63* 
 
-0.001 
 
-1.88* 
 
0.022 
 
1.78* 
 1-PIN -2.007 -3.41*** -0.006 -1.86* -0.000 -0.29 0.010 2.03* -0.006 -0.99 0.000 1.00 0.030 2.55** 
Median PIN -2.055 -2.27* -0.000 -1.92* -0.008 -1.32 -0.012 -4.87*** 0.030 0.73 -0.010 -1.03 0.009 1.04 
 1-PIN -2.113 -1.04 -0.001 -1.55 -0.044 -2.03* 0.031 2.46** -0.004 -1.64 0.006 1.75* 0.000 1.22 
Large PIN -2.819 -3.12** -0.005 -0.75 -0.002 -1.46 -0.045 -1.07 0.001 2.15** -0.001 -1.33 0.000 1.07 
 1-PIN -3.007 -3.69*** -0.000 -0.43 -0.031 -0.89 0.037 2.08* -0.000 -1.21 0.004 1.86* 0.002 0.64 
 
